Goldmann on Lukacs & Heidegger
Ralph Dumain
rdumain at igc.org
Tue, 20 May 2003 09:43:44 -0400
On Lucien Goldmann's LUKACS AND HEIDEGGER: TOWARDS A NEW PHILOSOPHY
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979):
I know a bit about Goldmann's literary theory, but I still don't have
enough overall context to place his attitude towards this subject matter,
which is mostly about basic philosophical issues, except for a brief
excursion into Goldmann's literary terrain. The biggest unknown as far as
this book is concerned is Goldmann's attitude toward the later Lukacs and
by extension towards Lukacs' view of the younger Lukacs. This book
concentrated exclusively on the Young Lukacs up to the historical moment of
HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS. The early Lukacs is the basis of the
comparison with Heidegger. Goldmann has obviously infused his views with
some brand of Hegelianism. He sees Lukacs and Heidegger both outgrowths of
this tradition; it's what they share even in their mutual opposition.
For Heidegger the historical subject is the individual. For Lukacs it is
social classes, which Goldmann also suspiciously names the "transindividual
subject." [p. 8] Lukacs adopts the Hegelian notion that history of the
realization of the idea of freedom. For Heidegger there is only
authenticity and inauthenticity and a Romantic view of history. For Lukacs
there is no difference between the human sciences and
philosophy. Heidegger's strict separation of the two is correlated to his
interest in elites alone as positive historical actors. Both are
antipositivists, but for Lukacs the dividing line is between the natural
and human sciences. [pp. 8-9] I'm skipping over Goldmann's remarks on
language and the rest of this introductory chapter. There is another
important point made, however. There is an analogous relationship between
the two thinkers and the dictatorships to which they rallied, Stalin's and
Hitler's, which failed to live up to the principles their would-be
philosophers set down for them. [pp. 16-17]
The next chapter is on reification, zuhandenheit, and praxis. Goldmann
begins with the controversial claim that Heidegger alludes to Lukacs in
BEING AND TIME and is concerned with refuting him. [p. 27]
The following chapter is on totality, being, and history. Lukacs' notion
of collective praxis is not to be found in Heidegger, who is still mired in
various dualisms, including science vs. philosophy and the ontological vs.
the ontic. Heidegger has no real explanation for the social world of
inauthenticity. Goldmann gives priority to Lukacs in formulating the basic
ideas of modern existentialism in THE SOUL AND THE FORMS. [p. 45] Already
Lukacs breaks with Kierkegaard, and questions western individualism while
criticizing inauthentic life. [pp. 46ff] Both Lukacs and Heidegger see
meaning in relation to the collective subject or the individual dasein, but
Lukacs sees mediation between the immediate given and the
totality. Without this, there are only the formalist historical
classifications or irrationalist views of history. [p. 50]
The following chapter is about objective possibility and possible
consciousness. In striving for its maximum possible consciousness, the
petit bourgeoisie, unable to grasp the totality, ends up joining the class
with the strongest position. This is revealed in the uneasy relationship
of writers to political orders. Ilya Ehrenburg rallies behind or
criticizes Stalinism; Kastner has a parallel relationship with Nazism. [p. 57]
This latter point is interesting but I find it very fishy. To me all this
idealist talk about collective subjects is suspect. And while it's true
that the petit bourgeoisie has trouble grasping the whole, the marginalized
position of deracinated intellectuals has its advantages. It's interesting
that Richard Wright (in his still unpublished writings of the 1930s), who
came from the bottom rung of society, thought that this marginalized
intermediate position could give one a privileged vantage point.
For some reason I marked a discussion of Rosa Luxemburg viz. Lenin on class
alliances, spontaneity and the party, and the possible consciousness of
social classes. [p. 65] Lukacs' HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS is seen as
essentially Luxemburgian. [p. 58]
The theme of the next chapter is subject-object and function. Here we get
a precis of Goldmann's famous analysis of Pascal and the Jansenists. It
seems to me this analysis stands on its own regardless of what thinks about
the basic philosophical postulates of collective subjects and the
like. Goldmann ends up addressing the general question of meaning and the
dilemmas involved, for example, in Althusser, who poses the alternative of
Spinoza vs. Feuerbach, interpreted in dubious ways. This somehow ends up
as a choice between mechanism and idealism, a dichotomy which plagues the
history of Marxism as well as social science in general. [pp. 76-77] Both
Hegel and Marx reject this dichotomy. Then there is a return to the
discussion of Jansenism, and eventually of contradiction and coherence in
world views. [p. 83]
The fifth chapter of this section of the book is on the topicality of the
question of the subject. This is where the discussion of Adorno, already
summarized, takes place. This is preceded by an analysis of the social
genesis of Althusserianism and the rebellion against existentialism, which
also correlates to the post-war stabilization of capitalism. [p. 89]
The book's final chapter, being and dialectics, sums up everything I find
obnoxious in it. The collective subject, totality, and subject-object
identity do not in my opinion provide an adequate ontological foundation,
though this framework makes sense up to a point. Goldmann concerns himself
with the problem of adequation of scientific knowledge, but his bearing
toward the subject-object relation obviates a standard materialist/realist
view.
Goldmann is quite willing to criticize Stalinism, admit the difficulties of
revolutionary prospects in the current situation (1960s), and so
forth. And of course he is not shy about linking Heidegger to
Hitler. Goldmann is pretty much silent about the late Lukacs and Lukacs'
repudiation of the young Lukacs. And I think this is the major symptom of
my puzzlement over this book. Goldmann criticizes both Lukacs and
Heidegger, but is also sympathetic to both on some level. But ultimately
on what basis? The basis looks suspicious to me. Furthermore, while it is
a standard cliche of the artificial construct known as "Western Marxism" to
excoriate dialectical materialism and link it to Stalinist orthodoxy, my
own opinion is that idealism is just as or more congenial to
Stalinism. Early Lukacs with his collective subject and subject-object
identity seems to be _more_ conducive to Stalinism in some respects than
something like THE DESTRUCTION OF REASON, which comes into being with
Stalin's gun pointed to Lukacs' head. Hence Goldmann's ontological
foundation, the basis for his sympathy to these two figures, and his
silence about the later Lukacs, all place a question mark over this book.